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#2A - 3/17/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMESTOWN PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL #1772, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-2 04 
CITY OF JAMESTOWN, 
Employer. 
LOMBARDI, REINHARD, WALSH & HARRISON, P.C. (THOMAS J. 
JORDAN of counsel), for Petitioner 
DONALD E. LYNN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Jamestown 
Professional Firefighters Association, Local #1772, AFL-CIO 
(Local 1772) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) rendered on a unit 
placement petition involving four assistant chiefs employed by 
the City of Jamestown (City). The assistant chiefs had been 
removed from Local 1772's unit on their designation as managerial 
in 1986.y Local 1772 seeks by this petition to return the 
assistant chiefs to its unit because they allegedly have not 
performed managerial duties since the positions were designated 
managerial. 
-'City of Jamestown, 19 PEPJB 5 3 0 1 9 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 
Board - CP-204 -2 
After an investigation, which included a hearing, the 
Director dismissed the petition. He concluded that the continued 
managerial designation of all the assistant chiefs was warranted 
because of their involvement in cabinet meetings at which 
departmental policies are discussed and decided. The Director 
also held that Assistant Chief Charles Hajduk's responsibilities 
for labor contract administration and negotiation were separate 
grounds for his continued designation. 
In its exceptions, Local 1772 argues that the Director 
should not have given any weight to the assistant chiefs' duties 
and responsibilities as assigned or performed after July 1989, 
when it filed the petition. Local 1772 alleges that the 
assistant chiefs did not and were not required to perform 
managerial functions until the City knew that it was seeking to 
return them to its unit. At that time, according to Local 1772, 
the City "window-dressed" the positions to make them look 
managerial. 
The issue raised by Local 1772's unit placement petition is 
whether the assistant chiefs are most appropriately placed into 
Local 1772's unit. Therefore, we deny Local 1772's exceptions to 
the extent they argue that the managerial designations we made in 
1986 were incorrect or that managerial designations in general 
should not be based upon duties reasonably required but not yet 
performed. Managerial status, of course, would make the 
assistant chiefs' placement into Local 1112's unit inappropriate, 
Board - CP-2 04 -3 
but because it is the appropriateness of a unit including the 
assistant chiefs which is in issue under this petition, any 
proper basis for their continued exclusion from that unit would 
similarly necessitate dismissal of Local 17727s petition. 
However, as the Director premised his dismissal of the petition 
upon a managerial determination, as the assistant chiefs' 
managerial status appears to be the issue framed and litigated by 
the parties before the Director, and as the parties and the 
employees themselves have an interest in the managerial 
determination, we will review the Director's decision as 
rendered. 
Local 1772 claims that between 1986 and 1989, the assistant 
chiefs did not have any significant managerial duties and that 
the post-petition assignment and assumption of such managerial 
duties should be disregarded. In this respect, the Director 
appears to have considered post-petition conduct by the assistant 
chiefs only when he was persuaded that the conduct was a 
continuation of practices predating the petition. Without 
suggesting that the Director was limited in the consideration of 
post-petition conduct to the stated circumstances, we affirm the 
Director's determination. Our affirmance is based only upon the 
assistant chiefs' participation in the cabinet meetings because this 
aspect of the Director's decision applies equally to all of them. 
The record shows that cabinet meetings have been held regularly 
over the past few years, not just recently in response to Local 
Board - CP-204 -4 
1772's petition. The topics of discussion at these meetings, as 
summarized in the Director's decision, show that the assistant 
chiefs, as seconds to the chief in line-of-command, regularly 
participate in the decision-making process by which departmental 
objectives and policies are formulated and implemented. Their 
duties in this respect make their placement into Local 1112's unit 
inappropriate and, therefore, the Director was correct in dismissing 
the petition. 
For the reasons set forth above, Local 1772's exceptions are 
denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition must be, and hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
T^wll^ iCCllMfr/L 
Pauline R. Kmse l l a , Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Me/ber 
c J . Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MARVIN NORMAN CASID, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11508 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL NO. 2, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
MARVIN NORMAN CASID, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (JAMES D. BILIK of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Marvin Norman 
Casid to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) . After 
hearing, the ALT dismissed the charge filed against the United 
Federation of Teachers, Local No. 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) which 
alleges that the UFT violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to keep Casid informed 
about the status of a medical arbitration held in response to his 
discharge from employment because he was determined by his employer 
to be mentally unfit to perform his job duties. 
The ALT found that UFT was not responsible for the medical 
arbitration process, but had, nonetheless, voluntarily assisted 
Casid in good faith throughout the process which he had invoked. 
The ALT also held on a credibility resolution that Casid had not 
asked a UFT representative about the status of his arbitration in a 
Board - U-11508 -2 
telephone conversation. The ALT concluded that UFT cooperated with 
Casid throughout the medical arbitration process, shared information 
with him, and kept him up to date on the status of the 
arbitration. -1 
As the UFT correctly observes in its response, most of Casid's 
exceptions are not directed to either his charge or the ALT's 
decision. Instead, his statement of exceptions consists simply of 
personal, ethnic, religious and racial invectives directed against 
officers of the UFT, agents of Casid's former employer and the ALT. 
To the limited extent the exceptions are relevant to the ALT's 
decision, they present no basis upon which the ALT's decision could 
be reversed. 
The exceptions are denied, and the ALT's decision is affirmed 
for the reasons stated in his decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
auline R. Kinsella, ch P C airperson 
Ut^A^S^. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/tf'."rSchmertz, Member \ tf" 
-
7The arbitration was held and the medical arbitrator upheld the 
employer's medical determination. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9495 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
JAMES P. KEMENASH, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. 
MC DOWELL of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) issued after a hearing. The AKT 
dismissed PEF's charge against the State of New York (Department 
of Social Services) (State) which alleges that the State violated 
§209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by restricting a PEF steward's access to unit employees 
at the worksite and by pressuring or advising a unit employee to 
circulate among other unit employees a petition seeking that 
steward's removal from union office. 
The State in 1987 denied Marilyn Trudell, a PEF steward and 
State employee, access to the fifth floor in the building in 
which she worked and in which she served as a PEF steward. 
Board - U-9495 -2 
Trudell had earlier sued three employees with whom she worked 
alleging sexual and religious harassment and discrimination. 
Based upon concerns that the lawsuit could be disruptive at the 
workplace, the State instructed Trudell and the named individual 
defendants to restrict their presence on each other's floors to 
State business activities only. Trudell's steward duties 
involving employees on the fifth floor were to be "conducted on a 
floor other than 5." 
The ALT held that Trudell's restricted access to the fifth 
floor was neither per se improper nor improperly motivated. On 
the per se theory, the ALJ held that Trudell did not have a 
statutory right of access to the fifth floor of her building 
because there was no showing that access to that particular floor 
was necessary to properly serve the needs of any unit employees. 
On the second theory of liability, the ALT credited the State's 
witnesses who testified that their sole motivation for 
restricting Trudell's access to the fifth floor was to avoid a 
possible confrontation between Trudell and any of the employees 
named in her lawsuit. 
As to the aspect of the charge which alleges that the State 
instigated a petition drive to remove Trudell from her PEF 
stewardship, the ALT held that there was inadequate credible 
evidence to establish that the State was responsible for the 
circulation of the petition. 
Board - U-9495 
-3 
PEF in its exceptions objects generally to each of the ALJ's 
conclusions, advancing to us essentially the same facts and 
arguments as were presented to the ALT. Having read the record 
and the exceptions, we find no basis to reverse or modify the 
ALJ's findings of fact or law. We, therefore, affirm the ALJ's 
decision for the reasons stated by her. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
#2D - 3/17/9.2 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THOMAS CONDE, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12497 
SUFFOLK COUNTY BOCES III, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS CONDE, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Thomas Conde to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing his charge against the 
Suffolk County BOCES III (BOCES) as legally and factually 
deficient. The charge alleges that BOCES violated the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it discharged him from 
employment. 
The Director dismissed the charge because it failed to plead 
any facts which would establish that BOCES discharged him for 
reasons which would violate the Act and as untimely because the 
discharge of which he complained occurred more than four months 
before the charge was filed. 
Conde's exceptions do not address the first basis for the 
Director's decision.. Instead, Conde argues only that the BOCES 
did not have valid reasons to discharge him and he asks us to 
Board - U-12497 -2 
find out why the BOCES took the actions it did, beginning with 
the elimination of his teaching program in 1988. 
PERB's jurisdiction, in relevant part, is limited to 
deciding whether an employment action was taken for a reason 
which the Act makes an improper basis for decision, usually some 
form of union-related activity. Without allegations of fact 
sufficient to bring a charge within our jurisdiction, we may not 
decide whether an employment action was well reasoned or 
violative of an individual's other contractual, statutory, 
administrative or constitutional rights. For example, Conde 
claims that one of the reasons BOCES terminated him was because 
health care for his family was too expensive. However, even if 
shown, that would not establish a basis for a finding of 
violation under the Act. Moreover, we do not investigate a 
party's allegations, even those over which we have jurisdiction. 
It is the charging party's obligation to plead and prove a case 
and to do whatever investigation is considered to be necessary. 
Conde has filed exceptions to the Director's determination 
that his charge was untimely because it concerned a discharge 
from employment which took place in June 1990. Conde argues that 
his charge should be considered timely because he first began his 
contacts with PERB in June 1990 and because he was unaware that 
charges must be filed within four months of the conduct alleged 
to be improper.-7 
^Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1(a)(1). 
Board - U-12497 -3 
As to Conde's first argument, the timeliness of a charge is 
measured from the date on which it is filed with us. The charge 
in this case, which is the only matter before us, was filed on 
May 8, 1991. Therefore, the charge cannot be made timely based 
upon other types of contacts with the agency prior to the filing 
date of the charge. 
As to Conde's second argument, the Director correctly 
observed that a party's ignorance of the four-month limitation 
period does not suspend its applicability. A party who is 
ignorant of a requirement under the Rules is no differently 
situated than a person who is mistaken in his or her 
understanding of the meaning or application of the Rules. We 
have consistently refused to suspend application of the four-
month rule in the latter circumstance-7 and the same timeliness 
disposition should be made in the former circumstance. 
Conde's timeliness arguments are not aided by the allegation 
in his exceptions that no one in his union or on PERB's staff 
with whom he had contact told him about the four-month period for 
filing charges. Conde's allegation against the BOCES cannot be 
made timely by the alleged failure by either his union or a PERB 
staff member to volunteer information to him. To do so would 
prejudice the BOCES for the conduct of others. 
-
7See, e.g. , New York City Transit Auth. , 10 PERB ?[3077 (1977) 
(mistaken belief that contract grievance extends filing period for 
charge); Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of New 
York, 15 PERB ^3 050 (1982) (mistaken belief that filing period runs 
from first discovery of improper motivation). 
Board - U-12497 
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For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pai lline R. Kinsella, 
U<M>U^ 
Chairperson 
£ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2E - 3/17/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12230 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondents. 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Richard W. 
Glasheen to the dismissal, without hearing, of his improper 
practice charge against the County of Suffolk (County) and 
Suffolk Community College (College), which alleges a violation of 
§2 09-a.l(a) and (b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). 
Glasheen is the College Director of Facilities and an 
Associate Professor of Administrative Services. The charge as 
filed alleges that the then-president of the College, Robert T. 
Kreiling, negotiated Glasheen's disciplinary transfer from one 
campus to another with Charles Novo, then the president of the 
Suffolk County Association of Municipal Employees (AME), an 
employee organization other than Glasheen's bargaining agent. 
Glasheen was notified that his charge was deficient because 
no facts were pleaded to establish that his transfer was 
negotiated as he claimed or that his transfer otherwise violated 
Board - U-12230 -2 
his rights under the Act. After receipt of three amendments 
constituting Glasheen's response to the noted deficiencies,-7 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissed the charge for the reasons previously given 
to Glasheen in the letter notifying him of the deficiencies in 
his charge. 
Glasheen's exceptions consist of an "expanded explanation" 
of the charge, a document captioned "deposition", which he had 
filed with the Director as an amendment, and a motion for a 
declaratory judgment that the College's board of trustees is the 
sole employer, under the Act, of individuals working in 
professional and nonprofessional capacities at the College. 
We affirm the Director's decision to dismiss Glasheen's 
charge for the reasons stated below. 
Glasheen's allegations make it clear that whatever 
discussions about Glasheen which may have occurred between AME 
and the College arose only in the context of AME's representation 
of the employees in its unit. AME represents a unit which 
includes individuals working under Glasheen's supervision, 
several of whom felt aggrieved by certain actions Glasheen had 
taken in his position with the College. The College and AME have 
a mutual right under the Act to negotiate unit employees' terms 
-''Glasheen also attempted on April 24, 1991 to add AME as a 
respondent, but he subsequently withdrew that request to amend. 
Board - U-12230 -3 
and conditions of employment and to resolve their grievances.-7 
There is no claim that the communications between the College and 
AME related to any purposes other than the representation of AME 
unit employees' interests. Thus, even if, as Glasheen alleges, 
the communications between the County and AME may have affected 
Glasheen's employment relationship, that circumstance alone does 
not constitute improper interference with Glasheen's rights under 
§209-a.l(a) of the Act or improper support of AME under §209-
a.l(b) of the Act.-7 That Glasheen considers AME's complaints 
to be inaccurate, its threatened grievance against the College 
meritless, and the College's response unjustified are immaterial 
to the disposition of this charge.-7 
Having determined to dismiss this charge for the reasons 
stated, the precise identity of Glasheen's employer, whether it 
be the County, the College, or both as a joint employer is 
ixAct, §204 
-
;A claim that an employer has unilaterally changed an employee's 
terms and conditions of employment without negotiations with the 
employee's bargaining agent can be raised in a charge filed by that 
employee's bargaining agent under §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Individual employees have no standing to file such a charge. See, 
e.g. , City School Dist. of the City of New York, 22 PERB J[3012 
(1989). 
% e express no opinion, of course, as to Glasheen's rights in other 
forums under contract or other statutes. 
Board - U-12230 -4 
immaterial. Therefore, we deny Glasheen's motion for a 
declaratory judgment.-'' 
Based on the above, the Director's dismissal of the charge 
is affirmed and Glasheen's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
-'On the issue of employer status in county community college 
situations, see Genesee Community College and County of Genesee, 24 
PERB J[3 017 (1991), and Niagara County Community College and County 
of Niagara, 23 PERB [^4052 (1990) . 
#2F - 3/17/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AFSCME COUNCIL 66, o/b/o, 
AFSCME LOCAL 930, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-1132 6 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
JOEL POCH, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROBERT J. LANE, SR., ESQ., and RICHARD D. KREIGER, ESQ., 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by both AFSCME 
Council 66, o/b/o, AFSCME Local 930 (AFSCME) and the Erie County 
Water Authority (Authority) to an Administrative Law Judge's 
(ALJ) dismissal of AFSCME's charge against the Authority. 
AFSCME alleges that the Authority violated §209-a.l(a) and 
(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
created a 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift for line maintenance crews. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the unilateral change aspect 
of the §209-a.l(d) allegation on a finding that PERB had no 
jurisdiction over it under §2 05.5(d)-7 of the Act because the 
^Section 2 05.5(d) of the Act provides: 
[T]he board shall not have authority to enforce an 
agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction over 
an alleged violation of such an agreement that would 
not otherwise constitute an improper employer or 
employee organization practice. 
U-11326 - Board 
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schedule change arguably was covered by the parties7 contract. 
The ALJ dismissed both a residual allegation that the Authority 
bargained the schedule change in bad faith, and the §209-a.l(a) 
allegation, which is similarly based upon the Authority's lack of 
good faith during negotiations on the schedule change, because no 
facts were offered to support a charge of surface bargaining or 
bad faith negotiations. 
AFSCME argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
holding that PERB was without jurisdiction over its unilateral 
change allegation. AFSCME further argues that if its unilateral 
change allegation does raise a jurisdictional issue, it should be 
conditionally dismissed with an express opportunity afforded it 
to reopen pursuant to our decision in Herkimer County BOCES.^ 
AFSCME also excepts on the ground that the ALJ incorrectly 
overlooked the Authority's overall course of conduct. 
The Authority agrees that the charge was properly dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, but it excepts to the ALJ's dismissal 
of the affirmative defenses it raised to the merits of AFSCME's 
charge. 
For the reasons below, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Before we can consider the merits of a particular improper 
practice charge, we must first determine that it is within our 
jurisdiction for we have no power to consider improper practice 
^20 PERB ?[3050 (1987) . 
U-11326 - Board -3 
allegations except as the Legislature has empowered us to do so. 
The record shows that, pursuant to the parties' collective 
bargaining agreement, all line maintenance employees were 
historically scheduled to work from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The 
record further shows that AFSCME argued before the ALT that the 
line maintenance employees are not shift workers for whom the 
contract specifies three shifts, including the 4:00 p.m. to 
midnight shift which the Authority established for a seasonal 
line maintenance crew. As the ALT correctly observed from the 
contract language and AFSCME's arguments thereunder, the 
unilateral change aspect of the charge raised only an arguable 
violation of contract. In effect, AFSCME in this respect alleges 
that the Authority's new 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift violated the 
contract by expanding the starting and quitting times of line 
maintenance employees from their fixed hours of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 
p.m. This is clearly a contractual dispute which is specifically 
beyond our jurisdiction under §2 05.5(d) of the Act. As AFSCME 
did not file a grievance, the ALT was correct in not issuing a 
conditional dismissal under Herkimer County BOCES.-7 
As to the exceptions which are directed to the ALT's 
disposition of the §209-a.l(a) allegation, the Authority's 
unilateral imposition of a new shift is not per se an 
interference with the unit employees' statutory rights, and there 
-''See Erie County Water Auth. , 22 PERB [^3006 (1989); Elmira 
Heights Cent. School Dist. . 21 PERB ^[3031, at 3068 n. 5 (1988) . 
See also City of Albany, 25 PERB [^3006 (1992) . 
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is nothing in the record which would evidence either that the 
imposition of the shift was improperly motivated or that the 
Authority was engaged in what AFSCME characterizes in its 
exceptions as "a repugnant course of conduct intended to 
undermine the viability of the recognized labor organization." 
Having found that we are without jurisdiction over the 
unilateral change aspect of this charge, we need not reach the 
other exceptions raised by the parties which are directed to that 
allegation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and the parties' exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
auline R. Kinsella, P Chairperson Pauline K. Kinsell 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
#3A - 3/17/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ENDICOTT TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, AFT 
LOCAL #2 641, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-377 6 
UNION-ENDICOTT CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Endicott Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, Local #2641, has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All teachers, including long-term substitute 
teachers who teach for a contiguous semester or 
longer; 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Certification - C-3776 Page 2 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Endicott Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, Local #2641. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
,^S-M<\6(|U 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
r
 c Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe] 
*^L^  
STATE OF NEW YORK #3B - 3/17/92 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
/ 
In the Matter of 
DANSVILLE NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, NYSUT,AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3869 
DANSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Dansville Non-Instructional 
Employe'es Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employe'es of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All noninstructional employees, including 
aides, monitors, bus drivers, mechanics, 
maintenance/custodial, secretarial and 
cafeteria employees, nurses and supervisor bus 
mechanic/shop foreman. 
Certification - C-3869 Page 2 
Excluded: Supervisor buildings and grounds, supervisor 
transportation, supervisor cafeteria, secretary 
to the superintendent of schools, A/P clerk, 
secretary to the business manager, tax 
collector, treasurer budgeting account clerk in 
the business office, business manager/district 
clerk and building custodial supervisor. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Dansville Non-Instructional 
Employees Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
<L%.b*i 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
'alter L. Eisenberg, Member Wa 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED INDUSTRY WORKERS, LOCAL 42 4, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-3883 
WEST HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
- and -
LOCAL 144, DIVISION 100, SEIU 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that United Industry Workers, Local 
424, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
Case No. C-3883 -2-
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time Cleaners, 
Custodians, Cleaner Attendants, 
Groundskeepers, Motor Equipment Operators, 
Head Custodians, Supervising Groundskeepers, 
and Maintainers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with United Industry Workers, Local 
424. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any other 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 17, 1992 
Albany, New York 
aline Kinseila, Chairperson 
7. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric Jyf Schmertz, Member 
